We analyze the computational complexity of Halpern and Pearl's (causal) explanations in the structural-model approach, which are based on their notions of weak and actual causality. In particular, we give a precise picture of the complexity of deciding explanations, ¡ -partial explanations, and partial explanations, and of computing the explanatory power of partial explanations. Moreover, we analyze the complexity of deciding whether an explanation or an ¡ -partial explanation over certain variables exists. We also analyze the complexity of deciding explanations and partial explanations in the case of succinctly represented context sets, and the complexity of deciding explanations in the general case of situations. All complexity results are derived for the general case, as well as for the restriction to the case of binary causal models, in which all endogenous variables may take only two values. To our knowledge, no complexity results for explanations in the structural-model approach have been derived so far. Our results give insight into the computational structure of Halpern and Pearl's explanations, and pave the way for efficient algorithms and implementations.
INTRODUCTION
The automatic generation of explanations for humans is of crucial importance in areas like planning, diagnosis, natural language processing, and probabilistic inference. Notions of explanations have been studied quite extensively in the literature, see especially [21, 14, 36] for philosophical work, and [25, 38, 22] for work in AI that is related ¢ Alternate address: Institut für Informationssysteme, Technische Universität Wien, Favoritenstraße 9-11, 1040 Wien, Austria. E-mail: lukasiewicz@kr.tuwien.ac.at.
to Bayesian networks. A critical examination of such approaches from the viewpoint of explanations in probabilistic systems is given in [4] .
In a recent paper [18, 20] , Halpern and Pearl introduced an elegant definition of causal explanation in the structuralmodel approach, which is based on their notions of weak and actual causality [18, 19] . They showed that this notion of causal explanation models well many problematic examples in the literature. Note that Halpern and Pearl's causal explanation is very different from the concept of causal explanation in [28, 29, 15] .
The following example from [18, 19, 20] illustrates the structural-model approach. See especially [1, 13, 31, 32, 17] for more details on structural causal models.
Example 1.1 (arsonists)
Suppose two arsonists lit matches in different parts of a dry forest, and both cause trees to start burning. Assume now either match by itself suffices to burn down the whole forest. We may model such a scenario in the structural-model framework as follows. We assume two binary background variables While the semantic aspects of explanations in the structural-model approach have been thoroughly studied in [18, 20] , an analysis of their computational properties is missing so far. In this paper, we fill this gap. Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
We analyze the computational complexity of Halpern and Pearl's explanations in the structural-model approach [18, 20] . In particular, we draw a precise picture of the complexity of deciding explanations, ¡ -partial explanations, and partial explanations, and of computing the explanatory power of partial explanations.
We also analyze the complexity of the natural problem of deciding whether an explanation or an ¡ -partial explanation over certain variables exists.
We show that deciding explanations and partial explanations has a higher complexity in the case of succinctly represented context sets. Generalizing from contexts to situations, in contrast, does not increase the complexity of deciding explanations.
We also show that all analyzed problems have a lower complexity in the binary case.
Note that detailed proofs of all results are given in the extended paper [10] .
PRELIMINARIES
We assume a finite set of random variables. 
CAUSAL MODELS

CAUSALITY
We now recall weak causes from [18, 19] We recall a result from [11, 12] , which shows that deciding weak cause is complete for ¦ (resp., NP) in the general (resp., binary) case. Note that this result holds also when the domain 
Theorem 2.4 (see [11, 12]) Given
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EXPLANATION
We now recall the concept of explanation from [18, 20] . Let is not, as here, the minimality condition EX3 is violated.
PARTIAL EXPLANATION AND EXPLANATORY POWER
We finally recall the notions of partial and ¡ -partial explanations and of explanatory power [18, 20] 
COMPLEXITY CLASSES
The complexity classes that we encounter are shown in Fig. 2 . They are well-known classes from the Polynomial Hierarchy (PH), or derived from them. We recall that 
OVERVIEW OF RESULTS
In this section, we give an overview on the complexity results that we derive, and discuss possible implications. 
PROBLEM STATEMENTS
In our analysis, we focus on the following problems, which are major tasks in explanation-based causal reasoning: 
, and a probability function .
In all problems, the probability function is assumed to be polynomially computable.
The first problem, Explanation, is the recognition of an explanation. It emerges directly from the definition of explanation in Section 2.3 and captures its intrinsic complexity. The problem Explanation Existence is associated with the important task of finding an explanation for an event n . Similar as in other frameworks for explanations (e.g. [27, 37] ), the set focuses attention to a subset of the variables, in terms of which the explanation must be formed. Finding explanations is certainly the central task of a causal-reasoning system built for applications in practice, and thus this problem deserves special attention. The problems ¡ -Partial / Partial Explanation and ¡ -Partial Explanation Existence can be viewed as relaxations of Explanation and Explanation Existence, respectively, in a probabilistic context. Explanatory Power is the problem of computing the "goodness" of a partial explanation ! 3
, given by the coverage of the cases where ! 3
is true in the contexts . This information can be used to rank partial explanations and single out "best" ones.
MAIN RESULTS
Our main complexity results are compactly summarized in Tables 1-3 . Besides the general case, they include results for binary causal models, and also address succinct context representation (see Table 2 ) and a generalization from contexts to situations in [20] (see Table 3 ). Tables 1-3 show completeness under standard polynomial-time transformations [24, 30] , and thus sharply characterize the complexity of the problems. From the results in Table 1 , it appears that finding explanations and ¡ -partial explanations is at the third level of PH. Thus, explanations are harder to compute than weak causes, which lie at the second level of PH [11] . On the other hand, recognizing explanations and ¡ -partial explanations is only mildly harder than recognizing weak causes, which is ¦ -complete. The reason is that by the latter, condition EX2 amounts to a conjunction of a linear number of problems in ¦
All results in
, and EX3 to the negation of such a problem; EX1 and EX4 are easily checked. Thus, by usual techniques, the explanation check can be reduced to a conjunction of problems in ¦ Table 2 shows results for some of the problems in a setting where contexts are succinctly represented. In fact, Table 1 assumes that the set of contexts is enumerated in the input. However, may contain exponentially many contexts; a descriptive representation can be much more compact and desirable in practice. In the succinct representation setting, we thus assume that is given by a tractable membership function Å y
SUCCINCT CONTEXTS
. is a conjunction of primitive events. The definition is similar to the one of explanations, and is too involved to be presented here (see [20] ); it covers basic explanations as a special case. Interestingly, general explanations are not more difficult to recognize than basic explanations.
SITUATIONS
RESTRICTED CASES
This concludes our exposition of the complexity results in the general case. Tables 1-3 also show results for the restriction to binary causal models, where each endogenous variable may take only two values. In this case, the complexity of all considered problems drops by one level in PH; this parallels the drop of the complexity of weak causes from ¦ to ¡ V ¢ in the binary case [11] . The membership parts can be derived analogously as in the general case, and the hardness parts by slight adaptations of the constructions in the proofs, where certain subcomponents for weak cause testing are modularly replaced.
Some of our hardness results remain valid under further restrictions, such as a boundedness condition on the causal model [11, 12] . In particular, all hardness results from Tables 1-3 hold for primitive events n ; thus, complex events are not a source of complexity. To avoid a proliferation of results, we do not further consider restrictions here.
IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPUTATION
For "efficient" algorithms that generate explanations or "best"
¡ -partial explanations, we can draw the following conclusions. Both must solve an inherent ° -hard problem, i.e., a problem at the third level of PH; such problems are rather hard to solve. Informally, the problem is "triple NP-hard:" even if we could use a subroutine for solving ¦ -complete problems for free, the problem would be intractable (NP-hard). Similarly, ¦ -complete problems are intractable even if we could use a subroutine for solving ¡ ¢ -complete problems for free. Thus, computationally speaking, generating explanations is rather difficult. In particular, a simple NP-style backtracking strategy that explores, similar as a simple Davis-Putnam style SAT-solver, a polynomial-depth search tree is infeasible. By similar arguments, polynomial-time reductions to a SAT-solver or a computational logic system which can handle problems with complexity up to ¦ , such as DLV [9] are infeasible.
On the other hand, an explanation can be computed using a nested backtracking procedure (modeling nested subroutine calls), or using flat backtracking calling a subroutine for ¦ tasks (e.g., calls to DLV). A further possible perspective are translations to QBF-solvers, which proved valuable in other applications [33] . We can compute an ¡ -partial explanation similarly. Computing a best one amounts to an optimization problem, which can be solved by binary search over the range [0,1] of ¡ , and thus in polynomial time with a ° o racle. A substantially faster algorithm seems unlikely to exist.
DERIVATION OF RESULTS
We now sketch how some of our complexity results can be formally derived. More detailed proofs are given in Appendix A. Detailed proofs of all results are given in [10] . Many of these proofs are technically quite involved. , enlarged by additional endogenous variables (see Fig. 3 
EXPLANATION
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PARTIAL EXPLANATION AND EXPLANATORY POWER
We now focus on the complexity of deciding partial and ¡ -partial explanations. The following lemma gives a useful characterization of the set h , which is used below. 
Lemma 4.3 Let
are pairwise disjoint, and Í ¤ is valid. Roughly, the main idea is to construct a problem instance such that
is the bitvector representation of the explanatory power of 
RELATED WORK AND CONCLUSION
There is quite some work on algorithms and complexity of finding abductive explanations (e.g. [3, 6, 7, 8, 35, 37] ) which play an important role in many AI problems including diagnosis, planning, or natural language processing. Roughly, a set of facts 
Þ
. While causal and abductive explanations (in a standard logical setting [27, 37] ) are apparently different concepts, they have similar complexity. In particular, deciding the existence of an abductive explanation is ¦ -complete in the propositional context [8] ; this matches our respective result on causal explanations for binary causal models. Computing causal and abductive explanations is polynomially intertranslatable in this case, while causal explanations from general causal models are harder to compute. Efficient transformations of causal into abductive explanations, and vice versa, is an interesting subject for further work.
Rather weakly related to ours are complexity results on maximum a posteriori explanations (MAPs, alias most probable explanations [25, 26] ), which are a dominating notion of explanation in the probabilistic AI literature. Computing a MAP in a Bayesian belief network, i.e., an assignment to all variables given a partial assignment such that its probability is maximum, is NP-hard [39] but is feasible in polynomial time with an NP oracle. This result is quite different from our results on ¡ -partial explanations, for two reasons: firstly, MAPs are computed from the set of all contexts, which is not part of the input. In this setting, ¡ -partial explanations have higher complexity. Secondly, MAPs are single contexts which maximize probability for a given evidence, while ¡ -partial explanations single out subsets of contexts which sensibly respect relevant information [20] . Computationally, it is more suitable to compare deciding 0 ! 3 in a belief network with our problem Partial Explanation under succinct context sets, where contains all possible contexts and emerges from independent exogenous variables. However, the former problem is ¡ ¢ -complete [5] , while the latter is, by our results, ¥ ² -complete and thus much harder. We may expect a similar relationship for computing the explanatory power vs the probability 0 ! 3 in a belief network, which can be done in polynomial time with a #P oracle [34] .
Our work on causal explanations continues and extends [11] , and contributes in paving the way for efficient algorithms and implementations of the structural-model approach by Halpern and Pearl. Our results give a picture of the complexity of explanations in the general and the binary case. However, it remains to identify cases of lower complexity, and in particular islands of tractability. Meaningful restrictions must be found that eliminate several sources of complexity, which is not straightforward. This and refining the complexity picture is part of our ongoing work. 
As shown in [11, 12] 
